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The Avatars in the Machine
Dreaming as a Simulation of Social Reality
Antti Revonsuo, Jarno Tuominen & Katja Valli
The idea that dreaming is a simulation of the waking world is currently becoming
a far more widely shared and accepted view among dream researchers. Several
philosophers,  psychologists,  and  neuroscientists  have  recently  characterized
dreaming in terms of virtual reality, immersive spatiotemporal simulation, or real-
istic and useful world simulation. Thus, the conception of dreaming as a simulated
world now unifies definitions of the basic nature of dreaming within dream and
consciousness research. This novel concept of dreaming has consequently led to
the idea that social interactions in dreams, known to be a universal and abundant
feature of human dream content, can best be characterized as a simulation of hu-
man social reality, simulating the social skills, bonds, interactions, and networks
that we engage in during our waking lives. Yet this tempting idea has never be-
fore been formulated into a clear and empirically testable theory of dreaming.
Here we show that a testable Social Simulation Theory (SST) of dreaming can be
formulated, from which empirical predictions can be derived. Some of the predic-
tions can gain initial support by relying on already existing data in the literature,
but many more remain to be tested by further research. We argue that the SST
should be tested by directly contrasting its predictions with the major competing
theories on the nature and function of dreaming, such as the Continuity Hypo-
thesis (CH) and the Threat Simulation Theory (TST). These three major theories
of dreaming make differing predictions as to the quality and the quantity of social
simulations in dreams. We will outline the first steps towards a theory-and-hypo-
thesis-driven research program in dream research that treats dreaming as a simu-
lated world in general and as a social simulation in particular. By following this
research program it will be possible to find out whether dreaming is a relatively
unselective and thus probably non-functional simulation of the waking world (CH),
a simulation primarily specialized in the simulation of dangerous and threatening
events that present important challenges for our survival and prosperity (TST), or
whether it is a simulation primarily specialized in training the social skills and
bonds most important for us humans as a social species (SST). Whatever the evid-
ence for or against the specific theories turn out to be, in any case the conception
of dreaming as a simulated world has already proved to be a fruitful theoretical
approach to understanding the nature of dreaming and consciousness.
Keywords
Altered state of consciousness | Avatar | Consciousness | Continuity hypothesis |
Dreaming |  Evolutionary  psychology |  Inclusive  fitness |  Kin  selection  theory |
Need to belong | Practise and preparation hypothesis | Reciprocal altruism the-
ory | Simulation | Social brain hypothesis | Social mapping hypothesis | Social
simulation  theory |  Sociometer  theory |  Strengthening  hypothesis |  The  dream
self | The inclusive fitness theory | Threat simulation theory | Virtual reality | Vir-
tual reality metaphor
Authors
Antti Revonsuo
antti.revonsuo@utu.fi   
Högskolan i Skövde
Skövde, Sweden
Turun yliopisto 
Turku, Finland
Jarno Tuominen
jarno.tuominen@utu.fi   
Turun yliopisto
Turku, Finland
Katja Valli
katval@utu.fi   
Turun yliopisto
Turku, Finland
Högskolan i Skövde
Skövde, Sweden
Commentator
Martin Dresler
martin.dresler@donders.ru.nl   
Radboud Universiteit Medical Center
Nijmegen, Netherlands
Editors
Thomas Metzinger
metzinger@uni-mainz.de   
Johannes Gutenberg-Universität
Mainz, Germany
Jennifer M. Windt
jennifer.windt@monash.edu   
Monash University
Melbourne, Australia
Revonsuo, A., Tuominen, J. & Valli, K. (2015). The Avatars in the Machine - Dreaming as a Simulation of Social Reality.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 32(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570375 1 | 28
www.open-mind.net
1 Introduction
There  may  be  no  Cartesian  ghosts  residing
within  the  machinery  of  the  brain,  but  still,
something rather peculiar is going on in there,
especially during the darkest hours of the night.
As we sleep and our bodies cease to interact be-
haviourally  with  the  surrounding  physical
world, our conscious experiences do not entirely
disappear. On the contrary, during sleep we of-
ten find ourselves embodied and immersed in an
experiential  reality,  an  altered  state  of  con-
sciousness  called dreaming.  The Dream Self—
the character with which we identify ourselves
in the dream world, and from whose embodied
perspective the dream world is experienced—is
who I am in the dream world (Revonsuo 2005).
But we are not alone in  this  alternative
reality—there are other apparently living, intel-
ligent  beings present,  who seem to share this
reality with us. We see and interact with real-
istic human characters in our dreams. Their be-
haviour and their very existence in the dream
world  seem  to  be  autonomous.  The  dream
people who I encounter within the dream seem
to go about their own business: I cannot predict
or control what they will say or do. Yet, they,
too, are somehow produced by my own dream-
ing brain.
On the one hand, dreaming is a solipsistic
experience:  when we dream,  we dream alone,
and outsiders have no way of participating in
our dream. Yet on the other hand, dreaming is
an intensely social experience, even if the social
contacts  and  interactions  in  the  dream world
are merely virtual. In this paper, we will explore
the idea that dreaming is a simulated world, but
not only a simulation of the physical world. It is
equally  or  perhaps  even  more  importantly  a
simulation of the social world. We will proceed
in the following way: 
First, we will argue that a remarkable con-
vergence  has  gradually  emerged  in  theories
about the nature of dreaming. The field used to
be a disunified battleground of directly oppos-
ing views on what dreams are, how exactly the
concept of “dreaming” should be defined, and
on the proper level of description and explana-
tion for dreaming. Recently, the field has con-
verged towards a more unified understanding of
the  basic  nature  of  dreams.  A  widely  shared
conceptualization of dreaming now depicts it as
the simulation of waking reality. We will briefly
describe  how  this  theoretical  shift  has  taken
place and where we currently are in the theoret-
ical definition of dreaming. This theoretical de-
velopment has paved the way for understanding
the  social nature of dreams in terms of social
simulation.
Second, we will explore the nature of so-
cial dream simulation in more detail.  In what
sense can dreaming be taken as a simulation of
our human social reality? How much and what
types of social perception and interaction occur
in dreams? This question can be broken down
into a number of more detailed questions. We
will try to answer some of these questions based
on the already existing knowledge and empirical
evidence about the social nature of dreams. Fur-
thermore, we will try to formulate more clearly
the questions that cannot yet be answered em-
pirically due to the lack of appropriate data. 
Third,  we  will  review  hypotheses  that
already address the question of the social nature
of dreams or assign a social simulation function
for dreams. Finally, we will outline some basic
ideas of  a Social  Simulation Theory (SST) of
dreaming that might offer some explanations for
the social nature of dreams, or at least might
produce well-defined, testable research questions
concerning  the  possible  functions  of  social
dream simulations. 
To describe and explain the social nature
of  dreams  as  social  simulation,  concepts  bor-
rowed from virtual  reality  technology may be
applied,  in  this  case  to  the  social  aspects  of
dreaming. One of these concepts is the notion of
“avatar”:  A simulated virtual human character
who plays the role of a corresponding real hu-
man within a virtual reality. If dreams are vir-
tual realities in the brain (Revonsuo 1995), then
we  ourselves  within  the  dream  world  are
avatars, and we interact with other avatars in-
side the simulated reality. Somehow, the dream-
ing  brain  is  capable  of  creating  credible,
autonomous  human  simulations  out  of  neural
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activities  in  the  sleeping  brain.  A  theory  of
dreaming as a social simulation should predict
what  kind  of  avatars  are  represented  in  our
dreams, what types of interactions we engage in
with them, and in particular,  why it would be
useful to simulate such avatars and interactions
in our dreams—what functions, if any, do they
serve for us.
2 Consciousness as reality-modeling and
world-simulation
Dreaming is the most universal and most regu-
larly  occurring,  as  well  as  a  perfectly natural
and physiological (as opposed to pathological),
altered state of consciousness. Thus, any plaus-
ible (empirical or philosophical) theory of con-
sciousness  should  also  describe  and  explain
dreaming  as  a  major  state  of  consciousness.
Most theories of consciousness, however, do not
consider dreaming at all or at least do not dis-
cuss the results of dream research in any detail
(Revonsuo 2006).
Dreaming presents a particularly difficult
challenge for externalist, embodied, and enact-
ive types of theories of consciousness.1 They all
anchor the existence and nature of  conscious-
ness to something in the world external to the
brain, or to some kind of brain-world relations
that,  at least partly,  reside outside the brain.
By contrast, the empirical evidence from dream
research shows that full-blown, complex subject-
ive experiences similar with or identical to ex-
periences during wakefulness (e.g.,  Rechtschaf-
fen &  Buchignani 1992), regularly and univer-
sally happen during rapid eye movement (REM)
sleep. The conscious experiences we have during
dreaming are isolated from behavioural and per-
ceptual  interactions  with  the  environment,
which refutes any theory that states that organ-
ism-environment  interaction  or  other  external
relationships are constitutive of the existence of
consciousness (Revonsuo 2006).
A few theories of consciousness have, how-
ever, taken dreaming as a central starting point
in  their  conceptualization  and  explanation  of
1 The same criticism may to some extent also apply to representationalist
theories of consciousness and dreaming, depending on which externalist
or internalist version of representationalism the theory is committed to. 
consciousness.  When  dreaming  is  taken  seri-
ously, ideas about the nature of consciousness
tend to converge on internalist theories of con-
sciousness that take consciousness and dreaming
to  be  varieties  of  the  same  internal  phe-
nomenon,  whose  main  function  is  to  simulate
reality.
One of the earliest attempts to conceptual-
ize both waking consciousness and dreaming as
the expressions of the same internally-activated
neural  mechanism,  only differently stimulated,
was put forward by Llinás & Paré in 1991:
[C]onsciousness  is  an  intrinsic  property
arising from the expression of existing dis-
positions of the brain to be active in cer-
tain ways. It is a close kin to dreaming,
where  sensory  input  by  constraining  the
intrinsic functional states specifies, rather
than informs, the brain of those properties
of external reality that are important for
survival. […] That consciousness is gener-
ated intrinsically is not difficult to under-
stand when one considers the completeness
of  the  sensory  representations  in  our
dreams. (1991, p. 531) 
The  argument  by  Llinás &  Paré (1991)  was
mostly  based  on  considerations  of  the  shared
neurophysiological mechanisms (in the thalamo-
cortical system) that could act as the final com-
mon path for both dreaming and waking con-
sciousness. Binding information together within
this system intrinsically generates consciousness
(“It binds, therefore I am”, Llinás 2001, p. 261);
but  only  during  wakefulness  is  consciousness
modulated by sensory-perceptual information—
in  this  model,  wakefulness  can  be  seen  as  a
dream-like state (Llinás & Ribary 1994).
Although  the  idea  that  dreaming  simu-
lates waking consciousness was implicit in this
neuroscientific theory, Llinás & Paré (1991) did
not  consider  the  phenomenology  of  dreaming
and consciousness in any detail. Theoretical ap-
proaches characterizing the nature of dreaming
as simulation, based on a combination of philo-
sophical  arguments  and  empirical  facts  about
dreaming, started to emerge during the 1990s.
In  Revonsuo (1995) the idea was put forward
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that consciousness in general and dreaming in
particular may best be characterized as a vir-
tual  reality in  the  brain,  or  a  model  of  the
world that places a (virtual) self in the centre of
a (virtual) world. All experiences are virtual in
the  sense  that  they  are  world-models  rather
than the external physical world somehow dir-
ectly apprehended. While the causal chains that
modulate the virtual reality are different during
wakefulness and dreaming, the virtual world is
ontologically  the same biological  phenomenon:
the  phenomenal  level  of  organization in  the
brain (Revonsuo 1995). All experiences are, ac-
cording to this view, in their intrinsic phenom-
enal character, no different from dreams. 
Metzinger (2003) took this line of thought
further and analysed dreams as complex, mul-
timodal,  sequentially  organized  models  of  the
world that satisfy several important constraints
of consciousness. Dreams activate a global model
of  the  world  (globality),  they  integrate  this
model into a window of presence (presentation-
ality), and this model is  transparent to the ex-
periencing  subject,  who takes  it  to  be  a  real
world  and  not  a  mere  model  of  the  world
(transparency)  (see  also  Windt &  Metzinger
2007). 
In Inner Presence Revonsuo (2006) presen-
ted a lengthy analysis and defence of the idea
that  dreams  are  internal  virtual  realities,  or
world-simulations,  and  argued  that  conscious-
ness in general would be best described and ex-
plained by treating dreaming as a paradigmatic
model system for consciousness. The world-sim-
ulation contains the virtual self and its sense of
presence in  the  centre of  the simulation.  The
virtual  self  is  perceptually  surrounded by the
virtual place; the virtual place in turn contains
multiple perceptual contents in the form of an-
imate and inanimate  virtual  objects,  including
human  characters.  The  virtual  objects  are
bound together from phenomenal features like
color,  shape,  and motion,  but  this  binding in
dreams  does  not  always  work  coherently,
thereby  resulting  in  bizarre  feature  combina-
tions and incongruous or discontinuous objects
and persons in dreams (Revonsuo 2006).
Recently,  Windt (2010) has formulated a
definition of dreams that stems from similar ba-
sic ideas. Windt’s definition aims to capture the
minimal set of phenomenological features that
an experience during sleep should have in order
to  count  as  a  “dream”  (as  opposed  to  other
types  of  sleep  mentation).  This  definition,  al-
though not  explicitly  applying  the  concept  of
“simulation”, is consistent with the world-simu-
lation model of dreaming. According to Windt,
dreams are Immersive Spatiotemporal Hallucin-
ations (ISTH): there is a sense of spatial and
temporal presence in dreams; there is a hallu-
cinatory scene organized around a first-person
perspective, and there is a sense of “now”, along
with temporal duration. The core feature of a
dream  experience  is,  in  Windt’s  ISTH, the
sense of immersion or presence in a spatiotem-
poral frame of reference. Thus, Windt’s ISTH,
as  well  as  Metzinger  and  Revonsuo’s  earlier
definitions, all involve similar ideas of dreams as
involving an immersive presence of a virtual self
in a virtual, spatiotemporally organized world-
model or simulation. 
3 Dreaming as simulation: Converging 
definitions from dream research 
Within empirical dream research, definitions of
dreaming have been highly variable and often
motivated by underlying theoretical background
assumptions  held  by  the  theorist.  Thus,  the
pure  description  of  the  explanandum,  which
should come first in any scientific inquiry, has
perhaps been biased by a pre-existing theory as
to what might count as the explanans—the en-
tities, processes, and concepts that are supposed
to explain the phenomenon. We will only briefly
mention three approaches to defining (and ex-
plaining) dreams in the recent history of dream
research, where the definition and description of
the data seem to have been theoretically motiv-
ated. 
The  field  of  dream research  was,  in  the
1970–1990s, a theoretically disunified field. The
deep disagreements over finding a definition of
“dreaming” that would be acceptable across the
field were noted by Nielsen (2000, p. 853)
[T]here is currently no widely accepted or
standardized definition of dreaming.
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as well as by Hobson et al. (2000, p. 1019):
[…T]here is no clearly agreed upon defini-
tion of what a dream is […] and we are not
even close to agreement. 
Hobson’s (1988,  1997,  2001) own definition of
dreaming is (or at least was in his earlier writ-
ings) a list  of some features of  dream experi-
ence. According to him, a dream is mentation
during sleep that has most of the following fea-
tures:  hallucination,  delusion,  narrative  struc-
ture,  hyperemotionality,  and  bizarreness.  This
definition may be (and was) criticized as includ-
ing only paradigmatic late-night REM dreams
that  are  spontaneously  remembered  and  on
which our everyday stereotype of what dreams
are like is based. This bias in the definition to-
wards REM dreams might be seen to reflect the
underlying theoretical idea or commitment, ob-
vious in Hobson’s earlier theories,  that dream
phenomenology  should  be  (reductively)  ex-
plained  by  referring  to  the  features  of  REM
neurophysiology. 
The  opposing,  cognitive–psychological
view  of  the  1980s  and  1990s  conceptualized
dreaming as a cognitive process that should be
explained  at  the  cognitive–psychological  level
(Foulkes 1985). References to the neurophysiolo-
gical level were unnecessary. In that time and in
the spirit of functionalism and classical cognit-
ive  science,  the  cognitive  levels  of  description
and explanation were in general seen to be com-
pletely  independent  of  implementation  levels,
such as neurophysiology. Furthermore, dreaming
was thought to occur in every stage of  sleep,
not only REM sleep, and rather than being full
of bizarreness was mostly a credible replica of
the waking world. Thus, according to the cog-
nitive  approach,  an  explanation  of  dreaming
cannot be based on neurophysiological mechan-
isms  in  general,  or  for  REM sleep  on  neuro-
physiology  in  particular.  The  explanation
should be given at cognitive levels rather than
neurobiological ones. Interestingly, it was prob-
ably  Foulkes (1985)  who  first  characterized
dreams in terms of the idea and the concept of
simulation.  In  1985  he  described  dreams  as
credible  world  analogs,  an  organized  form  of
consciousness that simulates what life is like in
a nearly perfect manner. 
A third theoretical definition of dreaming
came from clinical dream research, and reflected
the long and widespread idea in clinical psycho-
logy that dreams restore our emotional balance
and  have  a  psychotherapeutic  function.  Hart-
mann formulated  this  definition  of  dreaming
most clearly, when he said that “Dreaming, like
therapy, is the making of connections in a safe
place” (1996, p. 13). 
During recent years in dream research, the
concept of simulation has become a widely ac-
cepted  way  of  characterizing  and  defining
dreaming, as well as a way of formulating theor-
etical  ideas  about  the  potential  functions  of
dreaming.  Thus,  the  idea  that  dreaming is  a
multimodal, complex, dynamic world-simulation
in consciousness during sleep, may be a type of
conception  and  definition  of  dreaming  that
many if not most dream researchers are ready
to accept (Nielsen 2010). The various contents
of dreams—their events and objects and charac-
ters—can be taken to be simulations of  their
real-world counterparts. 
Taking Foulkes’s idea of dreams as cred-
ible  world  analogs  and  as  the  simulation  of
what life is like as a starting point for defining
dreaming, Revonsuo (1995) formulated the Vir-
tual  Reality  metaphor  and  later  the  TST
(Threat Simulation Theory) of the evolutionary
function  of  dreaming.  This  theory is  built  on
two background assumptions, the first of which
is precisely the definition of dreaming as “an or-
ganized  simulation  of  the  perceptual  world”
(Revonsuo 2000, p. 883).  An additional,  more
specific assumption of this theory is that dream
experience is specialized in particular in the sim-
ulation of  threatening  events: it tends to select
and include various types of dangerous enemies
and events and then simulates what it is like to
perceive  and  recognize  them  (simulation  of
threat perception) as well as how to react and
behaviourally  respond  to  them (simulation  of
threat  avoidance  behaviours  and  strategies).
Threat  simulations  appear  in  a  paradigmatic
and powerful form especially in nightmares, bad
dreams,  and  post-traumatic  dreams,  but  are
also abundant in many other types of dreams
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such as everyday dreams, recurrent dreams, and
in  various  parasomnias  such  as  RBD  (REM-
Sleep Behaviour Disorder).
Domhoff (2007), who represents a similar
psychological and content-analysis approach to
dream research as  Foulkes (1985), also charac-
terizes  dreams as mostly  realistic  and reason-
able simulations of waking life. By emphasizing
that,  according  to  convincing  empirical  data
from content-analysis studies of dreams, dream
simulations  are  mostly  realistic rather  than
overly bizarre and hyperemotional, Domhoff ar-
gues against the Hobsonian definition of dream-
ing as being full of bizarre contents. 
Still,  despite  their  disagreements,  both
camps now seem to accept the notion of simula-
tion as a valid description of the core nature of
dreaming.  Hobson,  in  his  new  protoconscious-
ness theory of dreaming and REM sleep (2009),
uses the concept of  simulation to characterize
the root phenomenon, protoconsciousness, from
which both our waking and dreaming conscious-
ness  arise.  According  to  Hobson,  protocon-
sciousness is  the simulated experiential  reality
or a virtual reality model of the world that the
developing  brain  turns  on  during  REM sleep
even  before  birth,  to  prepare  the  conscious
brain to simulate the external reality that it will
encounter through the senses after birth. This
model of the world is genetic, innate, and a hu-
man universal.  Protoconsciousness  acts  as  the
template on which both waking and dreaming
consciousness  are  built  after  birth.  Thus,  ac-
cording  to  this  theory,  protoconscious  dream
consciousness—a very basic form of an intern-
ally simulated world—comes into being prior to
waking consciousness, and is causally necessary
for waking consciousness. As  Hobson (2011, p.
30) puts it: “I REM, therefore I will be”. Ac-
cording to  Hobson & Friston (2012),  predictive
coding is an underlying mechanism in the brain
that  produces  predictive  simulations  of  the
world. Therefore, dreaming may also function as
a preparatory simulation of the waking world;
thus their  idea is  closely related to the other
simulation-theories of dreaming (Hobson & Fris-
ton 2012).
In  conclusion,  while  there  still  are  dis-
agreements about many details  of  dream con-
tent and function, there seems to be relatively
widespread  agreement  that  the  definition  of
dreaming includes  the idea  of  “simulation” of
the  waking  world.  The use  of  the  concept  of
“simulation”  to  characterize  dreaming  has  re-
cently gained wide acceptance in the field. The
simulation is variously characterized as the sim-
ulation of waking life, of waking reality, or of
waking  consciousness,  and  variously  called  by
different authors a realistic world-simulation, a
virtual  reality,  an  immersive  spatiotemporal
model of the world, and so on—but despite the
somewhat  varying  terminology,  the  different
terms  seem  to  describe  the  same  basic  idea.
This conceptual unification is a significant step
forward in the theoretical  description and ex-
planation  of  dreams.  It  paves  the  way  for  a
more unified theory of dreaming. 
4 The simulation of social reality in 
dreams
Dreaming not only places us into an immersive
(virtual) physical reality, but also immerses us
into a (virtual) social reality: in dreams we are
surrounded by  close  friends  and family  mem-
bers,  schoolmates,  teachers  and  students,
spouses,  romantic  partners,  old  crushes,  col-
leagues  and bosses,  celebrities,  politicians,  ac-
quaintances,  strangers,  and  mobs  as  well  as
monsters  and  other  fictitious  characters  from
movies and video games. All are there in dream
simulation  with  us  as  simulated  characters—
avatars—and we interact with these avatars in
multiple ways: we perceive,  recognize,  and se-
mantically classify them, we communicate and
talk with them, we collaborate with them, help
them, criticize them, fight them, escape them,
fear them, and love them. At least intuitively,
there is no doubt that in our dreams, we live
rich and colourful social lives, even if only simu-
lated ones. 
If dreaming in general can be defined as a
simulated world, the question arises whether the
concept of “simulation” can also be usefully ap-
plied to describe the social  reality of  dreams.
The  first  task  for  a  theory  that  takes  the
concept of simulation seriously is to simply de-
scribe the social contents of dreams as simula-
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tions  of  human social  reality.  The  descriptive
questions  can  be  formulated  in  more  detail
along the following lines:
1. What kind of social perception, social inter-
action, and social behaviours are simulated in
dreams? 
2. How frequently are different kinds of social
perception, interaction, and behaviour simu-
lated in dreams? How much variation is there
in  the  frequency  of  different  social  simula-
tions as  a function of  gender,  age,  culture,
and as a function of the quality and quantity
of social interactions during waking life?
It  is  possible  to find answers to many of  the
above descriptive questions from the already-ex-
isting  dream research  literature  where  various
aspects  of  the social  contents  of  dreams have
been reported, even if they have not been con-
ceptualized as social  simulations.  In what fol-
lows, we will first briefly review some of the ma-
jor findings in the literature that describe the
quality and the quantity of social simulation in
dreams.  Once  we  have  detailed  empirical  de-
scriptions of the quality and quantity of social
simulations in dreams, we may seek explanatory
theories and testable hypotheses that could ac-
count  for  why  we  have  social  simulation  in
dreams.
4.1 Evidence for simulation of social 
perception in dreams
From the already existing literature, it is pos-
sible to find statistics that describe the quality
and  quantity  of  social  simulations  in  dreams.
However, the theoretical concept of “social sim-
ulation” is rarely used in dream research literat-
ure for interpreting the descriptive results. Here,
we will briefly summarize only some of the ma-
jor findings. 
The  minimal  criterion  for  a  dream  to
count as a social simulation is that the Dream
Self is not alone in the dream but in the pres-
ence of at least some other animate character or
characters.  In  less  than  5% of  dreams  is  the
dreamer  alone  (Domhoff 1996);  thus,  on  this
minimal  criterion,  dreaming  seems  to  consist-
ently simulate social reality. The other animate
characters  simulated in  dreams are predomin-
antly  human  (normative  finding  in  adults  is
about 95% human, 5% animal), but the propor-
tion of animal characters varies in different cul-
tures and age groups, being highest (up to 30–
40%) in young children and in adults in hunter-
gatherer  societies  (Domhoff 1996;  Revonsuo
2000). As human characters are reported in al-
most all dreams, and typically there are two to
four non-self characters in a dream (Nielsen &
Lara-Carrasco 2007), the presence of simulated
human characters must be perceptually detec-
ted and registered in the dream by the dreamer.
Thus,  during  dreaming,  our  neurocognitive
mechanisms  constantly  simulate  social  percep-
tion. 
The minimal form of social perception is
to detect or register the presence of some human
character. A more sophisticated form is the per-
ceptual recognition and identification of the hu-
man characters who are present, first in terms
of some basic perceptual and semantic categor-
ies  (male/female;  familiar/stranger),  and  then
in terms of more detailed semantic and autobio-
graphical information about the precise identity
and name of the person. According to the Hall
and Van de Castle norms, about 90% of simu-
lated human characters have sufficiently definite
characteristics  to  be  semantically  categorized,
for example as male or female, or as familiar or
unfamiliar (Domhoff 1996). Thus, social recog-
nition and identification mechanisms are highly
engaged in almost all cases of social perception
in dreams. The dreamer knows, both during the
dream  and  afterwards  when  reporting  it,
whether the simulated characters present in the
dream are (or were) male or female, familiar or
strange, friend or family; and in most cases, the
familiar  characters  are  identified  as  particular
persons from real life.
Typically, a slight majority of dream char-
acters are avatars for familiar persons, although
there  are  well-established  gender  differences
(Domhoff 1996) that might, however, partly de-
pend on the gender distribution encountered in
the  real-world  social  environment  (Paul &
Schredl 2012). In a sample of five hundred REM
dreams (Strauch & Meier 1996) familiar people
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(friends, acquaintances, and relatives) were sim-
ulated most frequently (44% of all characters),
strangers represented about 25% of dream char-
acters,  and  undefined  people  about  19%.  In
most  dreams,  both  familiar  and  unfamiliar
people  were  simulated,  but  in  30%  only
strangers and in 20% only familiar people ap-
peared. The mixture of familiar and unfamiliar
people was true also at the individual level—
there were no participants who would have sim-
ulated only strangers or only familiar people in
their dreams.
For the most part, the human avatars in
the dream world are quite realistic simulations
of  their  waking  counterparts.  The  degree  of
realism, however, is difficult to express with ac-
curacy by any single  measure  or  quantity,  as
there are several features of human characters
that may independently vary along the dimen-
sion of realism (Revonsuo & Tarkko 2002). The
opposite pole for realism is called  bizarreness,
which  in  dream  research  refers  to  deviation
from the corresponding entity in waking life. 
If any kind and degree of deviation from a
waking counterpart is counted as a bizarre fea-
ture of a simulated person, then over half of the
simulated humans in dreams (over 60% accord-
ing  to  Kahn et  al. 2002;  53%  according  to
Revonsuo &  Tarkko 2002)  are  not  perfectly
realistic simulations. In contrast to other dream
characters the Dream Self is rarely distorted in
any way (Revonsuo & Salmivalli 1995).  Revon-
suo & Tarkko (2002) also found that in the vast
majority of cases (around 90% of dream charac-
ters), non-self dream characters are perceptually
entirely  realistic—they  look  the same as  their
counterparts look in real life. Where they devi-
ate from their counterparts is most often their
verbal and nonverbal behaviour. Thus, although
the perceptual simulation of human characters
is nearly flawless in dreams, the simulation of
expected or predicted  behaviours deviate from
waking  norms relatively  often,  though still  at
least a slight majority of behaviours by dream
characters are no different from waking life.
Dream  characters  are  also  spatially  and
temporally quite stable and continuous within
the  dream,  although  transformations  and dis-
continuities  sometimes  do  happen  (Nielsen &
Lara-Carrasco 2007). A simulated person some-
times appears from nowhere, is magically trans-
formed  into  someone  else,  or  suddenly  disap-
pears without a trace. But these kind of discon-
tinuous  features  account  for  less  than  5%  of
dream  character  features  (Revonsuo &
Salmivalli 1995;  see  also  Revonsuo &  Tarkko
2002).
By contrast, the behaviours expressed by
dream characters  are  relatively  often to some
extent  odd or  unpredictable.  Thus,  the  simu-
lated social reality in dreams is  less predictable
than  the  corresponding  social  reality  during
wakefulness. However, it is unclear how this un-
predictability  should  be  interpreted:  does  it
simply reflect  the difficulty (and consequently
failure)  of  simulating  complex  human  beha-
viours  and  interactions  realistically  by  the
dreaming  brain,  or  is  there  some other  more
functional explanation as to why the avatars in
our dreams tend to behave in more erratic ways
compared to their waking-life counterparts? We
will come back to this question when we con-
sider the possible functions of social simulation
in dreams. 
4.2 Evidence for simulation of social 
interactions in dreams 
The Dream Self and other dream characters are
simulated in almost all dreams, but how often
are they engaged in mutual social interactions?
According to Strauch & Meier’s (1996) data (140
REM dreams in which a Dream Self was present
and had an active role), in nearly 50% of these
dreams the Dream Self and characters interac-
ted, in an additional 20% they acted together,
and in  20% they  acted  independently  of  each
other. In the rest, the Dream Self acted alone.
Thus, social interaction or acting together is typ-
ically simulated in dreams where the Dream Self
is present together with some other dream char-
acters. When social interaction takes place, there
is almost always verbal communication or con-
versation between the Dream Self and the other
characters,  which tends to be focused on con-
crete topics (Strauch &  Meier 1996), and it is
understandable  and  something  that  would  be
sayable in waking life (Heynick 1993). 
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The more detailed nature of social interac-
tions has typically been categorized in terms of
“friendly”  and  “aggressive”  interactions.
Friendly  interactions  are  on  average  found  in
about 40% of dreams, whereas aggressive inter-
actions are somewhat more common, and occur
in about 45% of dreams in a normative sample
(Domhoff 1996).  Strauch and Meier,  however,
point out that in their sample, neutral interac-
tions were also common, and only about half of
the social interactions in their sample could be
classified as particularly friendly or aggressive.
The third  category of  social  interactions  that
has typically been quantified in dream reports is
sexual interactions, but they occur at a very low
frequency—in Strauch & Meier’s (1996) laborat-
ory data, in less than 1% of REM dreams, and
in the normative Hall and Van de Castle (Dom-
hoff 1996) data, in 4% of women’s and in 12%
of men’s dreams collected in a home setting. 
In sum, the simulation of dream characters
occurs very frequently, the characters are per-
ceived and recognized by the Dream Self, and
the Dream Self actively participates in commu-
nication,  social  interaction,  and  joint  actions
with  the characters.  The simulated characters
are also for the most part realistic, stable, and
represent a variety of different kinds of people.
Their behaviours,  however,  may sometimes be
unusual or inappropriate, and not exactly what
we would have expected from their counterparts
in real life. The tone of the interactions may be
neutral, friendly, or aggressive. 
When this evidence is taken together, we
may conclude that dreaming simulates  a rich,
variable, realistic, and concrete, but somewhat
unpredictable social reality, inhabited by a mix-
ture  of  familiar,  unfamiliar,  and  undefined
people.  Therefore,  we  have  solid  grounds  to
state that dreaming is, among other things, def-
initely a social simulation. If this is a universal
and ubiquitous feature of dreaming, what kind
of theory could explain it? Why does dreaming
simulate social reality at all? It is by no means
self-evident  that  this  should  be  the  case.
Dreaming could as well be only a simulation of
some basic features of the physical world: space,
time, objects, events, and the perception of and
bodily interaction with the physical world. Or it
could be a simulation of  thought processes,  a
thinking-through  of  our  problems,  or  of  our
emotional states and concerns. Moreover, simu-
lation of physical objects and their behaviour,
or  a  replay  of  thinking  and  emotions,  would
probably be a simpler task for the brain than
the simulation of a complex social world. Simu-
lation of human bodies and faces and interact-
ive behaviours such as conversations seems to
require a lot of energy and computing power—
these are very complex phenomena to simulate
realistically. Thus,  why does the sleeping brain
simulate social situations in such an intense and
invariant manner? Is there any convincing the-
oretical answer to be found to this question? 
5 The continuity hypothesis and social 
simulation theories of dreaming
There  are,  of  course,  countless  theories  of
dreaming. Some have explicitly considered the
role of social interactions in dreams, while oth-
ers make more general statements about dream
content. One of the latter is the Continuity Hy-
pothesis (CH), which states that dreams reflect
waking  life  experiences  (Schredl &  Hofmann
2003) or, more specifically, that our waking con-
cerns, thoughts, and experiences have a  causal
influence on subsequent dream content. Thus, if
certain types of social contacts or interactions
become more frequent (or less frequent) in wak-
ing life, their simulation in dreams becomes cor-
respondingly more (or less) frequent. 
This  general  principle  seems  to  hold  in
many cases. For example, in hunter-gatherer so-
cieties, where people perceive and interact with
wild animals on a daily basis, the proportion of
animal characters remains high (as it is in chil-
dren’s  dreams  across  cultures),  whereas  in
highly industrialized societies,  the animal per-
centage decreases  dramatically from childhood
to adulthood. But the CH merely restates this
empirical relationship; it cannot answer the the-
oretical  question  of  why  in  young  children’s
dreams the proportion of animal characters  is
high to begin with. TST (Revonsuo 2000) has at-
tempted  to  answer  this  question  by  referring
not to personal experiences in waking life, but
to a universal bias that is built into the default
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values  of  dream content  during human evolu-
tionary history.
The  CH,  even  if  on  the  right  track  in
many cases, is too vague and general as a theor-
etical explanation of the details of dream con-
tent. It does not predict in any detail how and
why the causal relationship between waking and
dreaming works. It also does not specify in any
detail what counts as a “continuity” and what
would count as a “discontinuity” between wak-
ing  life  experiences  and  dream simulations  of
the same. If something happens in waking life
how closely similar will the dream simulation be
to its waking origin, when will the same (or a
similar)  content  appear  in  dreams,  how  fre-
quently and for how long will it be incorporated
into dreams, and so on? These questions have
been studied under the concepts of day residue
(Freud 1950) and the dream lag effect (Nielsen
& Powell 1989). The CH takes almost any simil-
arity between waking life and dream life as a
confirmation of the continuity hypothesis. But
“similarity” as a relationship between two phe-
nomena  is  undefined,  ambiguous,  and  vague.
Something that in one respect is similar to its
waking counterpart is in another respect dissim-
ilar from it; thus it can be interpreted as either
continuous or as discontinuous with waking life.
Obviously, if the very same evidence could be
counted as either supporting or disconfirming a
theory, there is something wrong with how the
theory is formulated.2
As long as the CH remains vaguely formu-
lated, almost anything can be counted as its sup-
port. If the hypothesis does not specify in any de-
tail  the  potential  empirical  observations  after
which its predictions would be falsified, it is not
an empirically testable theory. Unless it is formu-
lated in a much more specific manner, so that
risky, exact predictions can be derived from it, its
explanatory power remains correspondingly weak.
In one study where more precise predictions from
CH were derived, the CH was found not to be
valid as a general rule concerning how often dif-
ferent everyday activities are reflected in dreams
(Schredl & Hofmann 2003).
2 For  a recent  exchange,  see  Hobson &  Schredl (2011) and related
commentaries in the International Journal of Dream Research (2011,
vol. 4).
Perhaps  a  more  precise  prediction  that
could be derived from CH can be formulated in
the following way: according to CH, dreams rep-
resent a random sample of recent waking exper-
iences  (or  a  random sample  of  their  memory
representations).  The  quantities  of  different
types of contents in dreams will therefore pass-
ively reflect the proportion of their occurrence
in waking life in the recent past (or the memory
representations of waking life). If CH is formu-
lated in this manner, as a prediction of random
sampling and passive mirroring of recent waking
life, then any systematic deviation from a ran-
dom sample  of  waking  contents  (or  memories
thereof)  would  count  as  evidence  against  the
CH. A deviation from passive mirroring of wak-
ing life would suggest that some kind of select-
ive mechanism is at work. An  active selection
bias of particular contents to be either included
in dreams or to be left out would be expected
to result in a disproportionately exaggerated or
diminished frequency of that content in dreams
as compared with waking life. This kind of for-
mulation of the predictions of CH makes it a
testable theory.
Some  more  specific  suggestions  about
dreaming  as  social  simulation  have  been  put
forward in the literature.  Brereton’s (2000) So-
cial Mapping Hypothesis suggests that dream-
ing simulates,  among other things,  the aware-
ness  of  other  persons  (social  perception)  and
their internal mental states (mentalizing or the-
ory  of  mind-abilities).  This  theory  proceeds
from an evolutionary standpoint, and considers
dreaming as a rehearsal  ground for emotional
and perceptual abilities related to the mapping
of the body image of the self into an emotion-
ally-salient social space. Others have also hypo-
thesized  that  our  mindreading  abilities  could
potentially be a target of simulated social per-
ception in dreams (Kahn &  Hobson 2005;  Mc-
Namara et al. 2007). Moreover, Nielsen & Ger-
main (2000)  have  suggested  that  dreaming
might simulate attachment relationships and in-
terpersonal bonds in ways that would maintain
their  adaptive  significance  even  today,  and
Humphrey (2000) has compared the social func-
tions of dreaming to those of play. The possibil-
ity that dreaming simulates pro-social and ag-
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gressive  social  interactions  in  distinct  sleep
stages, and that these simulations might exert a
regulatory influence on our waking social lives,
was put  forward by  McNamara et  al. (2005).
Last, Franklin & Zyphur (2005) have considered
how the simulation function of dreams might be
expanded to cover social cognition and complex
socio-cultural situations.3 
The problem with the above social simula-
tion theories of dreaming is that either they are
not detailed enough to be testable, or that few,
if  any,  have  ever  been  directly  tested  against
competing theories. They are interesting general
ideas, but not strictly formulated theories that
could be directly tested, or from which detailed
predictions  and potential  explanations  for  the
social  contents  of  dreaming  could  be  derived.
Thus, these theoretical ideas have not led to a
strong  empirical,  hypothesis-driven  research
program that would be able to systematically
test the plausibility of these theories.
Whenever we formulate theories of dream-
ing, or of the functions of dreaming, they should
be formulated  in  such detail  that  empirically
testable predictions can be derived from them.
Statements that are too vague or too general
(e.g., “dreams are continuous with waking life”;
“dreams are social simulations”) are difficult to
test as such. The predictions derived from gen-
eral  statements  are  too  unspecific.  Thus,  the
theories  remain  uninformative  but  of  course
consistent with almost anything we might real-
istically expect to find in dream content. If  a
theory  makes  no  detailed,  risky  predictions
about what should or should not be found in
dream  content  (under  some  specific  circum-
stances  or  in  specific  populations)  it  doesn’t
have  much  explanatory  power,  either.  So  far
there is no detailed, convincing, testable theory
3 Another  popular  theory  of  dreaming  postulates  that  the  realistic
simulation of character–self interactions serves the function of emo-
tion regulation during dreaming (Nielsen & Lara-Carrasco 2007). In
this group of theories, the function of dreaming is proposed to be the
calming down of emotional surges, such as we see in psychotherapy
(Hartmann 1995,  1996,  1998), or as reflecting the extinguishing of
fear memories (Nielsen &  Levin 2007). It is  increasingly apparent
that sleep plays a role in the consolidation of emotional memories,
but whether sleep also regulates the emotional charge and valence of
memories is not yet entirely clear (for a recent review, see Deliens et
al. 2014). Thus, whether the emotional regulation theory has specific
implications or predictions for social simulations in dreaming is not
evident.
of the nature and the function(s) of social simu-
lations during dreaming. There is also a lack of
data  on  the  detailed  quantity  and  quality  of
simulated  social  interactions  in  dreams,  and
how they relate to real social interactions in the
waking life of the same person. In the rest of
this paper, we will try to outline ideas for the
theoretical basis of a social simulation theory of
dreaming  and  to  formulate  some  empirically-
testable  hypotheses  directly  derived  from  the
theory. 
6 Towards a testable social simulation 
theory of dreaming
The relatively loose idea or the general observa-
tion that dreams are social simulations needs to
be  turned  into  a  theory  from which  testable
predictions  can  be  derived.  There  are  several
ways in which this could be done. In the rest of
this paper, we will formulate some suggestions
towards that end. The basic assumptions that
we adopt are based on the earlier work on the
definition of dreaming (and consciousness) as an
internal world-simulation in general (Revonsuo
2006). Any plausible theory of social simulation
should also  take  into consideration,  and draw
from, concepts and advances in the fields of so-
cial psychology and evolutionary biology, in or-
der to create a credible theoretical context into
which  social  simulations  in  dreams  can  be
placed. We will therefore connect the idea that
dreaming may function as a platform for simu-
lating  social  perception  and  interactions  to
some influential evolutionary biological and so-
cial  psychological  theories,  as  well  as  to  the
earlier simulation theory of the original evolu-
tionary function of dreaming, the TST (Revon-
suo 2000). 
The  two  generally-accepted  theories  in
evolutionary biology that seem to be relevant
for the formulation of an evolutionary SST of
dreaming are the Inclusive Fitness and Kin Se-
lection Theory (Hamilton 1964) and Reciprocal
Altruism Theory (Trivers 1971). Both are gen-
eral evolutionary biological theories that apply
not only to humans, but to multiple other spe-
cies as well. Further, both have received ample
empirical support from animal and human stud-
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ies,  and  could  thus  serve  as  solid  ground  in
guiding our thinking about social behaviours in
evolutionary biological terms. 
The  Inclusive  Fitness  Theory  (Hamilton
1964) postulates that an individual’s genetic re-
productive  success  is  the  sum  of  that  indi-
vidual’s direct reproduction and the reproduc-
tion of  the individuals  carrying identical  gene
alleles. An individual can improve its overall ge-
netic success by engaging in altruistic social be-
haviour that is directed towards individuals car-
rying identical alleles. The Kin Selection Theory
is a more specific form of the inclusive fitness
theory,  which  requires  that  the  shared  alleles
are  identical  by  descent.  Thus,  Kin  Selection
Theory  postulates  that  an  individual  can  in-
crease its inclusive fitness by directing acts of
altruism  specifically  towards  genetic  relatives,
whereas inclusive fitness as such is not limited
only to cases where kin are involved. Both, how-
ever, predict that acts of altruism should more
often be directed towards individuals who share
identical alleles. 
Reciprocal  Altruism  (Trivers 1971)  is
defined as behaviour whereby an individual acts
in such a way that temporarily reduces its fit-
ness  while  increasing  another  individual’s  fit-
ness.  However,  individuals  engage in altruistic
behaviour with the expectation that the recipi-
ent  of  the  altruistic  act  will  act  in  a  similar
manner at a later time. A strategy of mutual
cooperation may be favoured when there are re-
peated encounters between the same individu-
als. Although cheating might be more beneficial
for  the  individual  in  terms  of  immediate  re-
wards,  co-operation  might  provide  net  gain
compared to short-term benefits. 
Since selection pressures act on the typical
conditions present in the history of any species,
consideration of the demographics of the typical
evolutionary environment of humans is crucial
for understanding the evolution of social beha-
viours in our species. Recently, Hill et al. (2011)
analyzed  co-residence  patterns  among  thirty-
two  present-day  foraging  societies,  assuming
that  these  might  reflect  an  ancestral  human
group structure. They found that primary and
distant kin of an adult individual accounted for
approximately  25%  of  the  co-resident  adult
members  of  a  band,  i.e.,  about  25% of  adult
members in the group were directly genetically
related, whereas about half of the adults were
related through spouse or siblings’ spouses, and
the other 25% of adults were genetically unre-
lated. 
If we accept the assumption that this ob-
served distribution of relatedness approximates
the  degree  of  relatedness  in  ancestral  human
bands, there have been ample opportunities for
ancestral  humans to be subjected to selection
pressures  that  could  be  explained  using
strategies postulated by the inclusive fitness and
Kin Selection Theory, as well as Reciprocal Al-
truism Theory.  There  is  ample  evidence  that
people  are  more  likely  to  help  their  relatives
than  genetically  unrelated  individuals  (e.g.,
Burnstein et al. 1994), and that lethal violence
is more frequently directed towards genetically-
unrelated  individuals  than  relatives  (Daly &
Wilson 1988). People also tend to be more al-
truistic  towards  other  people  in  single  round
prisoner’s dilemma game than could be expec-
ted (Frank et al. 1993) in order to protect their
reputations.  This  seems  to  be  a  reasonable
course of  action, given that the faces of indi-
viduals  labelled as  untrustworthy cheaters  are
better recalled than those labelled as cooperat-
ive (Mealey et al. 1996). There are also rather
large interindividual differences in altruistic be-
haviour, depending on factors such as age, sex,
tendency to empathize, and circumstantial con-
ditions.
The  social  environment  has  afflicted
strong selection  pressures  on  human cognitive
faculties,  and  there  are  several  theories  that
consider  our  essentially  social  nature.  Dunbar
(1992, 2008) has forwarded the Social Brain Hy-
pothesis, which states that the main factor in
the increase of our neocortical volume has been
the cognitive demand bestowed on us by the in-
crease  in  hominid  group  size.  Sutcliffe et  al.
(2012) propose the idea that the costs and be-
nefits of social interactions have been a critical
driver for cognitive evolution. While our most
intimate relationships are a source of social sup-
port, they are also the most costly as the qual-
ity of  these relationships is  dependent on the
time invested in creating and maintaining them
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over  time.  Forming weaker  and less  time-con-
suming ties with acquaintances can provide be-
nefits such as information exchange and access
to resources without exhausting an individual’s
resources that are allocated for social  interac-
tion. Our individual social worlds thus consist
of  hierarchically-layered  sets  of  relationships
defined by relationship intimacy, and different
relationship types are designed to have different
kinds of functions.
Turning  our  attention  to  the  potentially
relevant  literature  in  social  psychology,  some
further  concepts  and measures  might  be  con-
sidered useful for dream theory. When it comes
to the simulation of  social  interaction,  one of
the most relevant concepts is the social “Need
to  Belong”  (Baumeister &  Leary 1995).  This
fundamental  motive  towards  interpersonal  at-
tachment  and  close,  supportive  social  bonds
pervades and influences our actions, emotions,
and cognitions, and is fulfilled only by social af-
filiation  and  acceptance.  To  help  us  navigate
the complex social world, and attune us to so-
cially relevant information, two further advance-
ments have been hypothesized  in  the form of
the Sociometer Theory (Leary et al. 1995) and
the  social  monitoring  system  (Gardner et  al.
2000). Sociometer Theory proposes an internal
monitoring device that feeds forward informa-
tion about our level of social  inclusion in the
form of self-esteem or self-worth (Leary et al.
1998), whereas the social monitoring system is
purported to guide the processing of social in-
formation  whenever  people’s  needs  to  belong
are not being met (Pickett et al. 2004). In sum,
the concept of “Need to Belong” in general, and
the suggested social monitoring systems in par-
ticular, might prove useful in postulating test-
able hypotheses for the functions of social simu-
lation in dreams. The Sociometer, for example,
might act in a similar fashion to the threat cues
postulated in TST, and prompt dreams to simu-
late relevant social skills or interactions.
An interesting developmental  suggestion
about the interplay between simulation mech-
anisms  and  social  deficits  has  recently  been
put  forward  by  Oberman &  Ramachandran
(2007), who propose that in typically develop-
ing individuals the abilities of Theory-of-Mind
(ToM),  empathy,  perceptual  recognition,  and
motor mimicry might be mediated by an in-
ternal  simulation  mechanism or  mechanisms.
By taking into consideration a condition—aut-
ism—where all these abilities appear to be im-
paired, they make the case for a possible link
between deficient simulation mechanisms and
behavioural and social deficits. The exact im-
plications of this idea for the hypothesis that
dreams serve a social simulation function re-
quires further consideration. One possibility is
to test whether individuals with Autism Spec-
trum Disorders (ASD) dream less of social in-
teractions,  or whether  their  dreams of  social
interactions are different in content from those
of other people. Thus far this line of research
has not been explored in depth. Daoust et al.
(2008) have looked into the dream contents of
people with ASD, and found that they report
significantly  less  dream-characters  and social
interactions  than  the  control  group.  They
note,  however,  possible  error  sources  in  the
testing procedure,  such as,  for example, how
the  reporting  of  dreams  itself  might  be  af-
fected by ASD.
There has been some research linking the
effects of attachment relationships to dreaming.
If, as attachment theory proposes, we use our
early experiences  with primary caregivers  and
other attachment figures as model states for fu-
ture  social  interactions  and the  way we  view
and attune to our social world, it could be as-
sumed that this would also affect our simula-
tions of this world. Early attachment and bond-
ing are, after all, quintessential for our species,
and according to Fonagy & Target (1997) might
also work as the basis for our abilities to men-
talize  or  to  create  a  ToM.  McNamara (1996)
has developed the idea that REM sleep is the
mechanism that activates  and maintains early
attachment relations, as well as pair-bonding in
later  life.  Selterman &  Drigotas (2009)  have
found  that  attachment  style  is  correlated  to
dream emotions when dreaming about romantic
partners, so that those with anxious or avoidant
attachment styles reported more stress, conflict,
and negative emotions. 
In an exploratory study on the dream con-
tents of those suffering from Complicated Grief
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(CG)  after  the  loss  of  an  attachment  figure,
Germain et  al. (2013)  found the  dreams con-
taining family members to become significantly
more frequent, while there was no marked in-
crease in the occurrence of deceased characters.
Males suffering from CG also reported more fa-
miliar persons in their dreams than the control
group. Both male and female CG patients also
exhibited fewer negative emotions and fewer in-
stances of  aggression in their  dreams,  and fe-
males  also  had decreased amounts  of  positive
emotions and friendliness.
We can thus conclude that the inherently
social nature of our species is deeply ingrained,
and has likely been as important for our sur-
vival in the ancestral environment as threat per-
ception and avoidance skills. SST can therefore
be formulated in an analogous manner to TST,
but in addition to the evolutionary background
theory, also taking into consideration important
social functions such as the need to belong, so-
cial bonding, social networking, and social sup-
port as essential ingredients. 
TST (Revonsuo 2000) places the contents
and the function of dreaming in an evolution-
ary-psychological  context  and  proposes  that
dreams  were  selected  for  their  ability  and
propensity to simulate threatening events in a
safe way, thus preparing the individual to sur-
vive real-life dangers. The hypotheses and pre-
dictions of the TST, especially concerning the
inclusion  of  threat  simulations  in  dream con-
tent,  have  gained  support  from  several  inde-
pendent sources, such as studies on the content
of nightmares and bad dreams (e.g.,  Robert &
Zadra 2014), recurrent dreams (Valli & Revon-
suo 2006;  Zadra et  al. 2006),  post-traumatic
dreams in children and adults (Bulkeley & Ka-
han 2008; Valli et al. 2006), dreams anticipating
a stressful experience (Arnulf et al. 2014), chil-
dren’s  earliest  dreams  (Bulkeley et  al. 2005),
dreams  and  mental  contents  in  parasomnias
(Uguccioni et al. 2013), the dreams and night-
mares of new mothers (which mostly depict the
infant in peril and trigger protective behaviours,
Lara-Carrasco et al. 2013, 2014; Nielsen & Lara-
Carrasco 2007), as well as dreams of the general
population  (for  a  review,  Valli &  Revonsuo
2009). 
Thus, when it comes to emotionally negat-
ively-charged  dream  contents  that  simulate
some sort of dangerous situation or unfortunate
event, the TST seems able to quite well predict
and explain many features of the quantity and
the quality of the threat simulations found in
the  data.  Therefore,  a  similar  theoretical  ap-
proach might also prove fruitful in the case of
social  simulation  theory.  The  SST,  however,
needs to be formulated in such a manner that
its predictions can be clearly distinguished from
those of the TST. 
As negative and threatening events com-
monly occur in dreams, the TST alone already
covers a fairly large proportion of dream con-
tent. But it also ignores a relatively large pro-
portion of dream content, as it does not offer
any explanation of  non-threatening dreams or
for the simulation of neutral and positive events
in dreams. This raises the question: do types of
dream events other than those that are threat-
ening have some evolutionarily-based simulation
function,  independent  of  the  threat-simulation
function of dreaming? Are there events that are
equally important targets for simulation as the
negative,  threatening  situations  simulated  in
threat simulation dreams? 
TST covers threatening events in dreams,
whether social in nature or not. Many threaten-
ing events of course do involve social interaction
(such as verbal or physical aggression), but are
explained by the TST as primarily simulations
of specific types of threat, and therefore as re-
hearsals of threat perception and threat-avoid-
ance behaviours, rather than as simulations of
social interactions as such. A social simulation
theory that explains dreams that TST does not
cover  should  thus  focus  on  social  simulations
that are largely independent of the threat-simu-
lation function. In some dreams these two types
of simulation may, however, be difficult to tease
apart. For example, a social simulation theory
might account for some social interactions that
happen during a threatening event in a dream,
such as how the Dream Self interacts with oth-
ers and collaborates with them during a threat-
ening situation. Furthermore, these two simula-
tion theories may not be mutually exclusive but
instead complement  each  other.  Some specific
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types of simulations of negative social interac-
tions are better accounted for by the TST while
other,  positively toned simulations can be ex-
plained by the SST. For example, from an evol-
utionary  perspective  it  might  make  sense  to
simulate different kinds of interactions, friendly
or aggressive, with people belonging to different
layers of our social hierarchy. 
We are open to the possibility that social
simulation is an original evolutionary function
of dreams alongside the threat-simulation func-
tion of dreaming. We believe that social simula-
tion  theories  hold  much  promise.  But  before
this belief can be empirically justified, a test-
able  version  of  the  social  simulation  theory
needs to be formulated. Such a theory should
independently  cover  the  social  simulations  in
dreams that fall outside the scope of the TST. 
Furthermore,  also  the  predictions  of  the
CH must be distinguished and separated from
those of  the SST. Therefore,  the question be-
comes:  What  aspects  of  human  social  reality
might  dreams  be  specialized  in  simulating  in
such a way that these social simulations have
significant consequences for cognition and beha-
viour during the waking state, and in virtue of
which social simulations during dreaming have
fulfilled important functions in the evolutionary
history of the human species? What kind of so-
cial-cognitive  processes  and  behavioural  social
skills might have been both critical enough both
for an individual’s survival and successful repro-
duction, as well as occurring frequently and uni-
versally enough in the human ancestral environ-
ment, to be selected for as a universal feature of
human  dreaming?  Moreover,  those  processes
and skills would have to be something that in
fact can be regularly simulated by the dreaming
brain, and they have to be contents that actu-
ally are being simulated frequently and univer-
sally in human dreaming, according to the evid-
ence from content analysis studies of dreaming.
To sum up, a credible version of the SST
should have predictions and explanations that
are clearly different from both the TST and the
CH. To be different from TST, the SST should
predict and explain the social simulations that
happen  outside  threatening  events  in  dreams,
and  to  be  different  from  the  CH,  the  SST
should predict that some types of social stimuli,
social cognition, or social behaviours are simu-
lated actively and selectively, so that they are
overrepresented in dreams as compared to wak-
ing life.
We will first consider some basic cognitive
processes that might fulfil these roles and will
then proceed to more complex social behaviours
and interactions. We admit that many of these
ideas are at this stage speculative. But if it is
possible  to  formulate  them  in  an  empirically
testable manner, then we can figure out later on
which ideas remain mere empirically unsuppor-
ted speculations, and which ones might actually
predict and explain central aspects of our dream
content.
6.1 The simulation of social perception as
a function of dreaming
Overall, there are good reasons to support the
view that  fast  and  errorless  social  perception
abilities were universally important skills for hu-
mans  during  their  evolutionary  history,  and,
therefore, rehearsing them through dream simu-
lations would have served to maintain and en-
hance their speed and accuracy during wakeful-
ness. In the ancestral environment, fast and effi-
cient social perception and recognition mechan-
isms were essential for telling friends and allies
apart  from potential  enemies.  Thus,  detecting
the presence of other human beings in the same
spatiotemporal context where oneself is located,
immediately classifying them in terms of famili-
arity, identity, and history of past interactions
with them, and predicting the nature of future
encounters with them must have been an im-
portant survival skill. Perhaps it was important
enough that rehearsal of these social-cognitive
functions  through  social  simulations  during
dreaming would have increased an individual’s
inclusive fitness.
The  social  perception  system  needs  to
quickly estimate answers to the following ques-
tions: am I alone in here or are there other hu-
mans present? Are the other humans around me
familiar to me or are they strangers? Thus, the
first stage of social perception is to detect other
humans in the vicinity and to classify them in
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terms of unfamiliar people (strangers) vs. famil-
iar people. As Diamond (2012) explains in “The
World Until Yesterday”, in most traditional so-
cieties  during  human  evolutionary  history,  to
encounter strangers was unusual and typically
considered  potentially  dangerous,  because  the
social interaction that followed might not neces-
sarily have been peaceful in nature. 
The second stage of social perception deals
in more detail with the familiar people that are
detected. If the people in my presence are famil-
iar to me, who exactly are they? What is my re-
lationship with them? What have my past inter-
actions with them been like? What should I ex-
pect the interaction between us to be like this
time around? To answer these questions, famil-
iar people need to be quickly identified. Based
on semantic  and autobiographical  memory in-
formation that we have about people familiar to
us,  we  quickly  activate  expectations  and
strategies as to how we should interact with the
people around us in the most constructive way.
But so far this idea is mere speculation.
What  kind  of testable  hypotheses  and  predic-
tions could be derived from this theory? How
could we derive predictions that clearly distin-
guish the SST from the CH? The CH does not
attribute any evolutionary simulation functions
to dream content; according to CH, dreaming
simply and passively  mirrors  whatever experi-
ences  have  recently  been  encountered  in  the
dreamer’s  waking  life  (and thus  impressed  on
long-term  memory).  Obviously,  therefore,  it
would not lend sufficient (or specific) support to
the SST to predict that social perception should
be found in dreams in the same proportions as
in waking life, because the CH predicts and ex-
plains  exactly  the  same  observation  and,
moreover, does it more parsimoniously, without
postulating  any  just-so-story  of  evolutionary
functions to social dream content.
The SST must thus go beyond the CH and
make the risky prediction that, if social percep-
tion  is  the  original  evolutionary  function  of
dreaming and it  is  therefore still  expressed in
our dream contents, then dreams are specialized
in  simulating  social  perception.  If  dreams are
specialized in simulating social perception, then
perceptual  contents,  cognitive  processes,  and
behaviours  relating  to  social  perception  skills
should occur (as simulations) in a selective or
exaggerated form in  our  dreams.  The testable
prediction  derived  from  this  is  that  during
dreaming,  social  perception  occurs  more  fre-
quently than  in  waking  life  (shows  quantitat-
ively  an increased frequency)  and/or qualitat-
ively  in  a  more  difficult  or  challenging  form
than in waking life. 
Quantitatively,  dream  simulations  could
exaggerate the proportion of the types of stim-
uli  that  were  most  important  to  recognize
quickly and accurately during evolutionary his-
tory (e.g., strangers vs. familiar people; enemies
vs. friends). It is important to process this in-
formation quickly because the information had
high  survival  value  in  ancestral  environments.
Furthermore,  dream simulations  could  present
qualitatively  challenging  stimuli  for  the  social
perception system; for example, more variety of
different kinds of stimuli (different kinds of fa-
miliar and unfamiliar simulated people), or am-
biguous stimuli that are more difficult to per-
ceive or interpret than real life stimuli (vague or
unstable simulations of people).
Conversely, if the social stimuli in dreams
simply mirror the social stimuli during wakeful-
ness  (and  memory  representations  of  them),
quantitatively  and  qualitatively,  then  the  CH
gains  support:  dream experiences  merely  copy
the patterns and rates of social stimulation en-
countered during wakefulness, but do not select-
ively and  actively simulate them in ways and
proportions  that  would  reflect  some  original
evolutionary functions and would therefore have
supported important survival skills in ancestral
environments.
To test  these two opposing theories,  SST
and CH, against each other empirically, we need
detailed information not only about the quantity
and quality of social perception in dreams, but
also about the quantity and quality of social per-
ception during wakefulness in the same subjects’
lives during the same period of their lives. Some
studies  already exist  that  provide us with this
kind of data, but most of the hypotheses remain
to be tested in future studies that should be ex-
plicitly designed to test the opposing hypotheses
and predictions of the two theories.
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McNamara et al. (2005) conducted an in-
teresting study that can be interpreted as test-
ing the SST prediction that social perception is
quantitatively  exaggerated  in  dreams  as  com-
pared to waking life. They conducted experience
sampling  from  fifteen  individuals  over  two
weeks  across  waking,  REM  sleep,  and  Non-
Rapid  Eye-Movement  (NREM)  sleep  states.
The  participants  recorded  verbal  reports  of
their  perceptual  and  other  experiences  when
paged at random intervals during sleep or wake-
fulness. 
The results showed that  more characters
appeared in dreams than in wake reports. Unfor-
tunately McNamara et al. (2005) do not report
the exact descriptive statistics of this finding, so
we do not know how large this difference ex-
actly was. In any case, this finding is better in
accordance  with  the  predictions  of  the  SST
than  CH:  Stimuli  requiring  social  perception
(human characters)  are  present  at  higher  fre-
quencies during dreaming than during wakeful-
ness,  when  experiences  from  both  states  are
sampled and reported in a similar manner. 
This important finding suggests that the
basic processes and skills required in social per-
ception are more engaged during dreaming than
during an equal stretch of time in wakefulness.
This  lends  support  to  the  hypothesis  that
dreaming is specialized in the simulation and re-
hearsal of social perception, which may thus be
one  of  the  original  evolutionary  functions  of
dreaming.  It  has  to  be  added,  however,  that
McNamara et al. (2005) is the only study so far
that provides us with this kind of data, where
the frequencies of the social contents of dream-
ing and waking experiences have been directly
compared with each other. Replications are ob-
viously required in different populations and in
larger  samples  of  dreams  and  waking  experi-
ences. But so far, so good for SST. 
The same study can be taken to test the
additional  prediction  of  SST,  namely  that
dream simulations of human characters should
exaggerate  the  proportion  of  the  particular
types of stimuli that were, during evolutionary
history,  most  important  to  recognize  quickly.
Meeting strangers posed a threat in the original
evolutionary  context;  thus,  the  SST  predicts
that  strangers  or  unfamiliar  people  should  be
overrepresented in dreams as compared to wak-
ing life,  to  simulate and rehearse the type of
perceptual categorization (familiar vs. unfamil-
iar) that was most important in the evolution-
ary  context.  McNamara et  al. (2005)  report
that the proportion of strangers (or unfamiliar
people) encountered in dreams is indeed signi-
ficantly higher than in waking life. Only 25% of
people present in the waking episodes were un-
familiar, whereas about 50% of the (simulated)
people in dreams were unfamiliar.  Again, this
discrepant pattern is well predicted by and ac-
counted for by the SST, but goes against the
predictions of the CH.
The recognition and identification of famil-
iar people as who exactly they are could also
potentially be a target of useful simulation in
dreams.  It  might  be  argued  from  SST  that
quick and correct recognition of familiar people
enhances the quick selection of the appropriate
social strategies and behaviours when we inter-
act  with  them.  As  about  50%  of  simulated
people  in  dreams  are  familiar,  there  are  still
plenty of opportunities to rehearse these recog-
nition skills. There are, however, no studies that
would  have  directly  and  quantitatively  com-
pared the frequency of face recognition during
dreaming and wakefulness. But still,  there are
some studies that question whether face recog-
nition is engaged during dreaming and to what
extent. 
Kahn et al. (2002) report, in a character
recognition  study,  that  about 45% of  familiar
dream characters were recognized through their
appearance  (including  facial  features),  and an
additional  12% by their  observable behaviour.
Thus, nearly 60% of dream characters are recog-
nized perceptually. However, about another 12%
of dream characters are recognized intuitively,
by “just knowing” who they are, which suggests
that in those cases, the “recognition” happens
in  a  top-down manner  and  is  therefore  inde-
pendent of the perceptual and facial features of
the dream character. 
If familiar persons are not overrepresented
in dreams to begin with (as the  McNamara et
al. 2005 study suggests), and only well  under
50% of the familiar people simulated in dreams
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are recognized through their facial features, this
pattern  of  data  does  not particularly  support
the idea that dreams are specialized in rehears-
ing familiar face recognition. However, we still
lack knowledge about the frequency of face re-
cognition in waking vs.  dreaming, and only a
study  directly  making  that  comparison  could
properly  test  this  idea.  So,  the  case  remains
open, but the expectations are not particularly
high that this prediction of the SST will gain
strong support in the future.
6.2 The simulation of mindreading as a 
function of dreaming
In addition to the processing of familiarity and
identity, another aspect of social perception is
called Theory-of-Mind (ToM) or “mindreading”.
This refers to the interpretations we automatic-
ally make about the internal mental states of
the people around us. We not only categorize
the people around us as familiar and unfamiliar,
and assign an identity to familiar persons, we
also  attribute  thoughts,  beliefs,  motives,  and
emotions to them. As mindreading is crucial for
our ability to predict and explain other people’s
behaviours, our mindreading abilities could po-
tentially have been a target of simulation during
simulated social perception in dreams (Kahn &
Hobson 2005; McNamara et al. 2007).
The  study  by  Kahn &  Hobson (2005)
quantifies the frequency of mindreading activit-
ies in dreams. In one sample of thirty-five parti-
cipants and about nine dream reports per parti-
cipant, about four dream characters per report
were observed on average. In over 80% of these
dreams,  the  participants  reported  having  had
engaged in  mindreading  (at  least  one  of)  the
other dream characters’ internal mental states.
In another sample, 24 subjects reported on av-
erage six dreams per participant. Each dream
was divided into separate dream events (on av-
erage four events per report were found), and
the participants were asked to report, concern-
ing each event, whether or not they were en-
gaged in mindreading the other dream charac-
ters. In 50% of the episodes, mindreading was
reported to have occurred. Thus, on the basis of
these results, we may say that mindreading fre-
quently occurs during dreaming.  Kahn & Hob-
son (2005)  in  fact  suggest  that  this  may  be
evidence for a specific simulation function being
at work:
The two studies undertaken here support
the idea that dreaming may provide a sim-
ulation  of  waking  life  as  suggested  by
Revonsuo (2000), though not restricted to
only threatening events. Instead, the data
of these studies suggest that if dreaming is
a  simulation  process,  it  is  a  simulation
that provides a way of knowing and deal-
ing with the intentions of others, both pos-
itive and negative. (p. 56)
The  above  studies  show  that  mindreading  is
well represented in dreams, but they cannot tell
us  whether  mindreading  is  overrepresented in
dreams,  as  its frequency of  occurrence cannot
be directly compared to waking life.  However,
McNamara et al. (2007) have conducted a direct
comparison  of  the  frequency  of  mindreading
between waking experiences, REM dreams, and
NREM dreams  of  the  same  subjects.  This  is
what they found:
REM reports were three times as likely to
contain instances of mind-reading as were
wake  reports  and  1.3  times  as  likely  as
NREM reports. Of 100 reports per state,
there were 39 instances of mind-reading in
REM reports,  29 in NREM reports,  and
12  in  wake  reports.  (McNamara et  al.
2007, p. 211) 
In conclusion, from looking at these studies, we
may say that mindreading activities frequently
occur in dreams, and that their frequency of oc-
currence is significantly greater during dreaming
than  during  wakefulness:  Mindreading  is
overrepresented  or  exaggerated  during  dream-
ing. Thus, this data supports the SST prediction
that dreaming specifically simulates mindreading
in  order  to  maintain  and  rehearse  our
mindreading abilities, rather than the CH pre-
diction  that  dreaming  simply  reflects  the
amount  of  mindreading  we  engage  in  during
wake experiences. 
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Another  finding  that  might  indirectly
lend support to the SST-mindreading idea is
that  the  behaviours  and  communications  of
dream characters  are  often bizarre  (Kahn et
al. 2002;  Revonsuo & Salmivalli 1995;  Revon-
suo & Tarkko 2002); that is, they are unusual,
unexpected,  and  thus  unpredictable  on  the
basis  of  our waking expectations.  Studies  on
intentional  social  interactions  between  the
Dream Self and other avatars in lucid dream-
ing suggest that dream characters are largely
independent  of  the  dreamer  and  behave
autonomously  (Stumbrys et  al. 2011;  Tholey
1989). Unusual and unpredictable  behaviours
could be interpreted simply as failures of the
dream  simulation  to  produce  credible  se-
quences of real-life behaviour. But they could
also  be  interpreted  as  particularly  engaging
and  activating  social  stimuli  that  serve  to
challenge  our  mindreading  skills.  That  is,
bizarreness in this case could be functional in
the sense that  it  makes the simulation more
challenging.  Perception  of  unexpected  beha-
viours may trigger a reconsideration of what is
going on in the character’s mind in order to
produce such unexpected behaviour, and thus
present  a  frequent  need  to  engage  in
mindreading as we interact with unpredictable
characters in our dreams. This idea could be
empirically tested by studying whether bizarre
behaviours  on  the  part  of  dream  characters
tend  to  trigger  mindreading  in  the  Dream
Self, and whether this feature of dreams might
partially  explain  the apparently  frequent  en-
gagement in mindreading in dreams.
6.3 The simulation of social interactions 
as a function of dreaming 
Humans are an essentially social species and an
individual’s  survival  in  the  ancestral  environ-
ment was most likely entirely dependent on the
individual’s ability to form long-lasting positive
social  bonds  with  close  kin  and  other  group
members who offered protection, access to nu-
trition and other crucial resources for survival,
collaboration, friendship, social support, mating
opportunities, and opportunities to gain a bet-
ter social status within the group. 
Social  interaction  in  dreams  is  a  more
complex  affair  than  simple  social  perception.
There  need  to  be  some  behaviours  that  link
dream characters and the Dream Self, where the
intentional behaviour of  one character (or the
Dream Self) is directed at another character (or
at the Dream Self), and the recipient somehow
registers it or reacts to it. Traditionally, in the
Hall &  Van de Castle (1966) content analysis
system, social interactions have been classified
into  three  different  categories:  aggression,
friendliness, and sexual interactions. It may be,
however,  that  these  three  categories  are  too
broad, and do not cover or identify all theoretic-
ally-interesting types of social interaction.
When it comes to the simulation of social
interactions, the predictions of the SST should,
again,  be  contrasted  with  the  predictions  de-
rived from competing theories. In this case the
SST needs to be distinguished from two other
theories: CH and the TST. The TST is a simu-
lation  theory  that  describes  and  explains  the
simulation of aggressive behaviours in dreams,
by  including  them  under  the  category  of
“threatening events”. The function of dreaming,
according  to  TST,  is  not  to  specialize  in  the
simulation of social interactions  per se, but in
threatening events; thus, any social interactions
are simulated in dreams not because they are
social events but because they are threatening
events. No independent social simulation theory
is required to explain the simulation of social in-
teractions involving a threat; and aggressive be-
haviours  between  dream  characters  are,  obvi-
ously, social interactions where the wellbeing of
the Dream Self or some other dream character
is potentially threatened. 
Compared to CH or SST, the TST can ac-
count for the overrepresentation of threatening
events and aggressive interactions in dreams (as
compared to waking life, McNamara et al. 2005;
Valli et al. 2008). The TST, however, gives no
description or functional explanation for neutral
and positive types of social interactions (unless
they occur as parts of a threatening event). The
TST assumes that neutral and positive events
in dreams are either parts of a threat simulation
(e.g., responding to a threat by helping others
who are targets of a threat) or that they repres-
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ent  some  kind  of  superfluous,  non-functional
dreaming  that  simply  goes  on  automatically
even  if  the  threat  simulation  mechanisms  are
not activated. Thus, when it comes to social in-
teractions, the SST should in particular predict
and explain the neutral and friendly types of so-
cial interactions, and show that some of them
are actively selected as targets of dream simula-
tion. In contrast, the CH predicts that neutral
and positive types of social interactions should
only occur in the same proportions as they oc-
cur in real life, passively reflecting their waking-
life frequencies. 
If,  according  to  SST,  the  simulation  of
neutral  and  positive  social  interactions  in
dreams serve to represent  and strengthen im-
portant  social  connections  and  to  rehearse
prosocial behaviours in relation to those connec-
tions,  then  these  types  of  interactions  should
frequently  occur  in  dreams.  This  would  serve
the  function  of  maintaining,  rehearsing,  or
strengthening our waking life social bonds and
networks, and would satisfy our social need to
belong  to  groups  that  enhance  our  survival.
After dreaming about prosocial behaviours, our
social bonds during wakefulness would automat-
ically be experienced as stronger and we would
be more likely to engage in behaviours that fur-
ther  strengthen  those  bonds.  Some  tentative
steps  towards  examining  how the  affects  and
contents  of  social  dreams  predict  subsequent
waking behaviour have been taken by Selterman
et al. (2014). They discovered that an increased
frequency of dreams involving significant others
was  associated  with  higher  levels  of  intimacy
and  interaction  the  following  day,  whereas
dream infidelity predicted less intimacy. Repor-
ted arguments in dreams were also found to be
correlated  with  subsequent  conflict  in  waking
life. They leave open the question whether this
is due to the conscious reflection of the report-
ing procedure, a more implicit association, or a
mixture of the two. 
Again, there are no detailed content ana-
lysis  studies  that  have  investigated  the  exact
nature of social interaction in dreams by taking
into account the social context of the interac-
tion;  that  is,  by  studying  who  is  engaged  in
what type of interaction and with whom. From
previous studies based on home dream diaries
we know that dreamer-involved aggression, ad-
justed to take  into  account  all  social  interac-
tions  except  sexual  interactions,  is  present  in
60% of male dreams and half (51%) of female
dreams (Domhoff 1996).  When male strangers
appear in a dream, the likelihood that physical
aggression will occur in that dream far exceeds
what would be expected on the basis of chance.
Basically this means that male strangers signal
physical  aggression.  The  dreamer,  however,  is
an aggressor in 40% of male dreams and a third
of all female dreams (Domhoff 1996). 
Yet, as the Hall and Van de Castle norms
indicate,  there  are  friendly  interactions  in
dreams—slightly  more  often  in  female  (42%)
than male (38%) dreams (Domhoff 1996).  Fe-
males also dream more often of familiar people
(58%) than of strangers (42%) while the oppos-
ite is true for males (45% vs 55%, respectively);
which might suggest that when there are more
familiar  people  in  dreams,  there  is  also  more
friendliness.  The  dreamer  participates  in  the
majority of interactions that involve friendliness
(84% for females, 90% for males), and the be-
friender proportion is 50% for males and 47%
for females.  Thus,  both sexes initiate friendly
interactions  in  their  dreams  approximately  as
often as they are befriended. Helping and pro-
tecting is the most frequent type of friendly be-
haviour in both sexes, followed by friendly re-
marks  and  compliments,  and  giving  gifts  or
granting  loans.  Surprisingly,  however,  there  is
very little mutual or reciprocal friendliness, so
although  friendly  interactions  are  initiated  in
dreams by the Dream Self or other characters,
in less than 10% of friendly interactions the act
is  reciprocated  immediately.  This  observation
goes against any social simulation theory that
predicts reciprocal friendliness should be highly
represented in dreams: this does not seem to be
the case.
McNamara et  al. (2005)  investigated
whether types of social interaction are different
in REM than in NREM dreams compared to
wakefulness, and noticed that aggressive inter-
actions  were  more  often  simulated  in  REM
dreams, whereas friendly interactions were more
often simulated in NREM dreams. Furthermore,
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dreamer initiated friendliness was more typical
for NREM than REM dreams. What is most in-
teresting  in  this  study,  however,  is  that  they
also found that social interactions in general are
more often depicted in both REM and NREM
dreams than in wake reports. While aggression
was more often simulated in dreams than en-
countered in waking life, the number of reports
with at least one occurrence of friendliness did
not differ significantly across sleep–wake states.
Thus, these observations imply that dreams do
not seem to overrepresent friendly interactions
as compared to waking experiences.
In sum, aggressive interactions seem to be
more  prominent  in  dreams  than  neutral  or
friendly  interactions,  which  would  lend  more
support to the TST than to SST, and friendly
interactions are not more prominent in dreams
than in waking life, which would lend support
to CH and the TST. Nevertheless, if simulations
are  biologically  functional,  and  if  these  two
types of simulation functions are not mutually
exclusive,  might there be enough room in the
dream  content  for  simulation  of  neutral  and
positive interactions, in such a way that it could
have contributed to the inclusive fitness of our
dreaming ancestors? 
6.4 Some testable ideas derived from 
SST
Let us see how this general approach to social
simulation in dreams could be translated into
some directly testable hypotheses. Now, a gen-
eral thesis derived from the SST could be for-
mulated as follows: 
Dreams  are  specialized  in  simulating  the
most important social connections and networks
of the dreamer to give an additional selective
advantage and to enhance the survival of  the
dreamer in waking life. The simulations of par-
ticular people (the frequency of their presence
in a person’s dream life), and the simulations of
positive  interactions  with  particular  people,
should focus on the people closest to us in wak-
ing life and on the social bonds most important
for our inclusive fitness in the real world.
This thesis could be directly tested by de-
riving some empirical predictions from it, telling
us what kind of  simulations of  social  interac-
tions and to what extent they should appear in
dreams.  If  dreams  are  specialized  in  the  way
predicted by SST, then the most important so-
cial networks and the people in them should ap-
pear  more frequently  in  dream life  than in a
corresponding  stretch  of  waking  life.  That  is,
their frequency of occurrence should be targets
of  active  selection  and  inclusion  into  dreams,
and hence over-represented and exaggerated in
dreams.
This empirical prediction could be tested
by identifying a person’s most important social
networks in waking life, and by quantifying the
frequency of  interactions  of  the  dreamer  with
those people during dreaming vs. during wake-
fulness. In the already existing literature, there
are some data relevant to the hypothesis, but
data that directly compares waking social  life
and dream life in the manner required to test
the hypothesis seems to be lacking. 
The  data  scattered  in  the  literature  de-
scribes  the  relative  frequency  of  dreams  in
which a certain type of close person appears on
average in the dreams of the general (or the stu-
dent) population. For example, romantic part-
ners occur in 20% of dreams and this frequency
correlates with the time spent together in wake-
fulness  (Schredl 2011;  Schredl &  Hofmann
2003). Core family members occur in 10%–30%
of dreams; parents in about 8%–20% of dreams,
and  siblings  from  2%–7.5%  of  dreams  (see
Schredl 2013). Friends occur in about 20% of
dreams (Roll & Millen 1979), but during long-
term isolation from social contacts with friends
in one case (Merei 1994) this declined to 10%.
In  studies  of  long dream series  from a  single
person,  a  close  family  member  or  spouse  has
been  found  to  be  the  person  most  often
dreamed about. In a sample of over two hun-
dred dream reports, reported by a married wo-
man (Arlie)  with  four  grown-up children,  the
most frequently occurring character is her hus-
band; whereas in a sample of over three hun-
dred dreams from an unmarried woman in her
thirties (Merri),  the most frequently occurring
character is her sister, who was no longer alive
at the time when the dream reports were collec-
ted (Schweickert 2007). 
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In Schredl’s studies, interesting analyses of
a long dream series from a single dreamer were
conducted, revealing the proportions of school-
mates (2012) and family members (2013) simu-
lated in dreams across a period stretching over
twenty years. Old school mates continued to ap-
pear in about 5% of dreams over the years when
the dreamer had nothing to do with them any
more  in  real  life.  Similarly,  family  members,
even when the participant was not living with
them anymore, still retained a strong if some-
what  reduced  presence  in  the  same  dream
series,  being present in approximately 15–20%
of the dreams over a twenty-year period. 
These results show that the probability of
occurrence of a character in dreams is to some
extent related to the amount of real life contact
with that person and to the closeness of the re-
lationship in real life, thus supporting the CH.
However, people who have at some point in life
been close and important do not seem to disap-
pear  totally from the  dream simulations  even
though they have long ago totally disappeared
from the real life of the dreamer. This feature of
the already-existing data suggests that simula-
tions of social contact might serve the function
of maintaining or strengthening close relation-
ships over time. When the frequency of a previ-
ously close and important social contact falls to
zero in waking life, and the person is no longer
encountered in waking life (like old school mates
after leaving school, or after the death of a fam-
ily  member),  the simulation of  such a person
seems  never  to  totally  disappear  from dream
life, even if the frequency of dream simulations
of that person to some extent diminishes. Social
simulations in dreams thus seem to maintain an
active storage and rehearsal of the most import-
ant and closest social relationships of our entire
lives, even when those relationships are broken
or discontinued for good, or are temporarily on
hold in our waking lives.
What happens if  a relationship that  has
disappeared from waking life is reactivated after
years  of  disconnection?  In  Schredl’s  (2012)
study, old schoolmates met for a reunion twenty
years after going their separate ways. Interest-
ingly, when the same relationships are re-activ-
ated in real life for just one day, the dream sim-
ulation of those social relationships is increased
significantly and for a long period of time (com-
pared  to  the  time  of  actually  meeting).  The
mechanism that reactivates old targets of simu-
lation might be analogous to that proposed in
TST for  the re-activation of  old threats.  The
frequency with which the most important real
threats  are  simulated  (e.g.,  in  post-traumatic
nightmares) increases when, during wakefulness,
new cues  are  encountered  that  are  associated
with the old threat possibly reoccurring in real
life.
These considerations suggest a more pre-
cise  function of  social  dream simulations that
could be formulated along the following lines.
We may call  it  the Strengthening Hypothesis:
the function of social simulations in dreams is
to maintain and strengthen the dreamer’s most
important social  bonds from waking life.  Con-
sequently,  a  prediction  derived  from  the
Strengthening Hypothesis can be formulated as
follows: if strengthening important social bonds
is a function of social dream simulations, then
dreaming  should  include  with  high  frequency
social interactions in which the (current or past)
most  important  social  bonds are strengthened
through various types of simulated positive so-
cial interactions and prosocial behaviours. Thus,
the frequency of prosocial, positive interactions
(bond-strengthening) with the most important
persons should clearly surpass the frequency of
negative  (bond-weakening)  interactions  within
dreams,  and also be more frequent in dreams
than in a corresponding stretch of waking life.
Schredl’s (2012, 2013) findings are to some
extent  consistent  with  both  the  CH and  the
SST,  but  do  not  allow  any  firm  conclusions
about which theory better predicts the occur-
rence of the most important social connections
in dreams. Studies that collect data from both
waking  life  and  dream  life  during  the  same
period of life from the same people, as well as
from the life history of these individuals, are ne-
cessarily required to test whether the represent-
ation of the most important connections is ex-
aggerated in dreams, or if they just reflect the
waking  frequency.  In  practice,  this  prediction
could be tested by identifying all  the interac-
tions between the dreamer and the people in his
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or her most important social networks, in both
dream and waking  reports.  Then the  interac-
tions could be classified according to whether
they tend to strengthen or weaken the relation-
ship  with  that  particular  person.  If  the  fre-
quency with which dreaming simulates positive
interactions surpasses the frequency of those in-
teractions in real life, then the SST would gain
credence over the CH.
Another  potential  simulation  function  to
consider can be called the Practise and Prepara-
tion Hypothesis.  According to this hypothesis,
the function of social simulations in dreams is
to force the dreamer  to practise important so-
cial bonding skills,  such as how to give social
support to others. The prediction derived from
this  hypothesis  states  that  if  practising  social
bonding skills is  a function of dreaming, then
the  dreamer  should  frequently  offer  various
types of social support to other dream charac-
ters, for example emotional, instrumental, or in-
formational support. Furthermore, the types of
social support offered should be dependent on
the degree of relationship intimacy, i.e., the dis-
tance between the self and the recipient in the
hierarchy of the social world of the individual. If
the Practise and Preparation Hypothesis is cor-
rect,  then  the  frequency  of  simulating  social
support should be higher than comparable be-
haviours in real life. 
These ideas are testable, but dream con-
tent studies are to be carefully designed with
the specific aim of testing them. In the literat-
ure already published,  friendliness  percentages
in different dream samples and descriptive stat-
istics  concerning  who  initiates  friendliness  in
dreams might  shed some light  on these  ques-
tions. However, without any data about the fre-
quency of occurrence of these same behaviours
in  the  waking  state  of  the  same  person,  the
purely descriptive findings from dreaming alone
will  not  be  able  to  separate  CH  predictions
from SST predictions. The comparable waking
data is crucial as a baseline against which the
dream data can be evaluated and in relation to
which  the  CH  predictions  can  be  contrasted
with the SST predictions.
In an ideal setting the hypotheses for the
SST and its proposed functions would also be
tested cross-culturally and in particular, as the
theory makes bold evolutionary claims, in tradi-
tional small-scale human societies.  As  Henrich
et al. (2010) have pointed out, the concentra-
tion of  behavioural research into the so-called
Western,  Educated,  Industrialized,  Rich,  and
Democratic  (WEIRD) societies  are highly un-
representative  of  the  species,  and  might  pose
problems for the generalizability of the results.
Furthermore,  by contrasting,  for  example,  the
differences  between  the  social  simulations  of
small-scale and Western societies, we might un-
cover  useful  information  about  the  plasticity
and ontogenetic mechanisms of the social simu-
lation function.
7 Conclusions
The concept of “simulation” is a useful theoret-
ical concept for dream research. It unifies defini-
tions  and  descriptions  of  the  basic  nature  of
dreaming, and helps to formulate testable theor-
ies of the function of dreaming. Applying this
concept to the social  reality of  dreams means
that we start to describe the persons and social
interactions  in  dreams  as  simulations  of  their
counterparts in real life. Consequently, we can
ask: How does the simulated social reality relate
to the actual social reality in the same person’s
waking life? Is it plausible to hypothesize that
the avatars in the dreaming brain might in fact
be there in order to force us to maintain and
practise  various evolutionarily important func-
tions of social perception and social bonding? 
In this paper we made an attempt to cla-
rify what it means to put forward the theoret-
ical statement that “dreaming is a social simula-
tion”, especially when this claim is offered as an
expression of a theory of the function of dream-
ing. The SST can be formulated in a testable
manner, and a number of  testable  predictions
can be derived from it. Some of those predic-
tions,  concerning  basic  social  perception  and
mindreading  abilities,  already  receive  rather
strong  support  from  the  published  literature.
Many more hypotheses remain to be tested. To
achieve theoretically-informative results and to
directly contrast the predictions of different the-
ories,  future studies have to be designed in a
Revonsuo, A., Tuominen, J. & Valli, K. (2015). The Avatars in the Machine - Dreaming as a Simulation of Social Reality.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 32(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570375 23 | 28
www.open-mind.net
strictly  theory-driven  and  hypothesis  driven
manner—which, unfortunately, is not a common
approach in dream research. 
If the SST, or some parts of it, prove suc-
cessful,  we have to be able  to show that  the
SST predicts the nature and the occurrence of
social  simulations  in  dreams  more  accurately
than  its  main  competitors,  the  CH  and  the
TST.  To  fare  better  than  the  CH,  the  data
would have to show that the most important so-
cial contents are actively selected for incorpora-
tion in dreams as social simulations, and there-
fore  rehearsed  in  an  exaggerated  quantity  or
form in dreams. To show that the CH is on the
right track, the data would have to show that
dream simulations merely reflect, both quantit-
atively and qualitatively,  whatever experiences
waking life has recently presented to the same
person. To go beyond what the TST predicts
and  explains,  the  data  supporting  the  SST
would have to show that dreaming over-repres-
ents and actively runs positive or neutral social
simulations in dreams that strengthen the skills
of social perception and bonding, but that have
nothing specifically to do with threat-perception
and avoidance.
At  this  point,  we  are  not  yet  sure  how
strong the empirical case for SST is going to be,
and whether the evidence will mostly turn out
to be for or against it. We shall wait for the
kind of studies that directly test SST and set it
against  other  theories’  predictions.  However,
what we are confident about is that SST is an
empirically testable theory, and that dream re-
search would in general gain much if dream con-
tent studies were rigorously designed to test the
predictions derived from opposing theories, and
if dream data were in general collected and ana-
lysed in a manner that provides us with strong
tests of  different theoretical hypotheses  rather
than just producing more and more purely de-
scriptive  data  of  dream  content  (and  then
presenting vague, post-hoc theoretical interpret-
ations  of  them).  In that  way,  dream research
would be able to find and test new, promising
theoretical ideas, perhaps derived from cognitive
and social  neuroscience and from evolutionary
psychological considerations. New theoretically-
guided  studies  would  help  leave  behind  old
ideas  if  they  did  not  generate  any  clear  and
testable  predictions  or  if  such  predictions  did
not gain sufficient empirical support.
Even if we will at some point be able to
explain some of the functions of social simula-
tion in our dreams, we might not be able to ex-
plain the  underlying mechanisms that generate
the simulations. The fundamental metaphysical
nature of the simulated persons inhabiting our
dreaming  brain  might  after  all  be  almost
equally mysterious as the immaterial nature of
a Cartesian ghost, because, like everything we
experience  in  our  dreams,  the  avatars  in  our
dreams are built out of features that have no
objective,  physically observable,  or measurable
substance. Instead, they consist of subjectively-
experienced phenomenal features,  and at least
at the present state of consciousness science, the
only  way for  us  to  get  any  empirically-based
data about them is  through the  introspective
reports  carefully  collected  from the  dreamers.
How  the  sleeping  brain  produces  vivid,  dy-
namic, complex phenomenality and organizes it
into  subjective  spatiotemporal  hallucinations,
inhabited by avatars and social simulations, still
remains beyond any current theoretical explana-
tions of dreaming and consciousness. Any plaus-
ible explanation of the actual brain mechanisms
that do the trick would have to solve the hard
problem of consciousness (Chalmers 1996) and
cross  the  explanatory  gap  (Levine 1983)
between the objective neural mechanisms in the
brain  and  the  subjective  experiential  realities
going on in subjective consciousness. We are not
quite there yet.
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